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Introduction
We reconsider competitive general equilibrium theory with constant returns as a framework for
studying technological innovation and its effect upon growth. As in Aghion and Howitt [1992],
Grossman and Helpman [1991] and Romer [1990] new goods and new technologies are introduced
because of the role of individual entrepreneurs in seeking out profitable opportunities. Unlike those
models we do not assume monopolistic competition or increasing returns to scale: the technology set
faced by our economic agents is a convex cone and competitive equilibria are efficient. We suppose
there are a countably infinite number of produceable commodities. Technological progress takes
place because entrepreneurs find it advantageous to introduce new activities that produce new
commodities, and these new commodities themselves make profitable the employment of other
activities that make use of them. Although, in the ensuing equilibrium, entrepreneurs do not actually
end up with a profit, it is their pursuit of profit that drives innovation. The result is an abstract,
dynamic model in the spirit of Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development in which relative
prices are altered by the action of entrepreneurs and economic growth takes place in a fluctuating as
opposed to a balanced way. Despite the existence of infinitely many commodities and activities,
efficient allocations can be decentralized in the classical way using the first and second welfare
theorems, and a transversality condition.
At any point in time a finite number of goods are produced through a finite number of activities.
Barring adoption of new goods or activities, this defines a neoclassical production economy in the
style of McKenzie [1981, 1986], the most popular example of which is the AK model of Jones and
Manuelli [1990] and Rebelo [1991]. The AK model has a simple dynamics: convergence to the
balanced growth path ocurrs in one period, after which the economy grows at a constant rate.
Modulo technical complications, a similar result holds true for more general, multisector versions of
the AK model such as those of Bewley [1982], McKenzie [1995] and Yano [1984] in which growth
at a constant rate is driven by accumulation of the capital. In our framework we can meaningfully
distinguish between the two main sources of economic growth: (i) capital accumulation; (ii)
adoption of more efficient techniques and new goods. The first is a well understood property of
economies with linear technologies, to which we have nothing additional to contribute. Contrary to
previous models, though, in ours adoption of more efficient techniques and of new goods is
continuously undertaken by entrepreneurs searching for profitable opportunities. The article
concentrates on this largely unexplored feature of the theory: endogenous technological innovation
under perfect competition.
The most elementary example of our theory is a simple vintage capital formulation of the AK
model, which we discuss in Section 2. This exhibits the two basic sources of growth mentioned
above. However, this type of model does not allow for the study of important issues associated with
innovative activity. Three stand out in particular: (1) the relation between the social value of an
innovation and the gains accruing to the innovator; (2) the pricing of “ideas” or, more generally, of
goods for which the initial set up cost is large compared to the marginal cost of reproduction; and,
(3) long run dependence upon initial conditions, or what we might describe as “growth anomalies”:
that an initially poorer country may in the long-run wind up using a superior technology, or the
possibility that a modest increase in savings may lead to a dramatic increase in growth. Models of
technology adoption with fixed costs or other increasing returns, in which some economic agents
enjoy monopoly power, provide clearcut answers to these problems. Previous models of growth
under constant returns are unable even to formulate them. In this sense, our model is both a
contribution to dynamic competitive theory, and an alternative tool to increasing returns and
monopoly power for modelling economic innovation.
The setting we examine has a continuum of infinitely lived identical households. They derive
utility from being able to enjoy a (possibly ever-increasing) amount of “characteristics”, as inLancaster [1966] and Stokey [1988]. There are a finite number of such characteristics and each
commodity is identified with a vector of them. So while the number of potential commodities is
infinite and viable ones change from period to period, the number of characteristics they produce is
finite and time-invariant. Our utility functions are standard, additively separable utility functions,
with a period utility a function on a fixed finite dimensional space. In the spirit of von Neumann we
study an environment with an activity analysis technology. However, as for produceable
commodities, the number of potential activities is allowed to be countably infinite. An activity is
characterized by a pair of input and output vectors and displays constant returns to scale. The input
goods used in production come from output in the previous period. The level at which an activity is
operated is limited by the availability of inputs and by aggregate demand and, therefore, relative
prices. It is well known that arbitrary diminishing returns technologies can be approximated by
activity analysis technologies. In addition, activities have a convenient interpretation as “inventions”,
“blueprints” or “ideas” and provide a convenient way of modelling changes in the production
possibilities set over time.
We concentrate on the factors determining the adoption of new activities. We do this because we
share the view that “it is entirely immaterial whether an innovation implies scientific novelty or not.
Although most innovations can be traced to some conquest in the realm of either theoretical or
practical knowledge, there are many which cannot. Innovation is possible without anything we
should identify as invention and invention does not necessarily induce innovation, but produces of
itself no economically relevant effect at all. The economic phenomena which we observe in the
special case in which innovation and invention coincide do not differ from those we observe in cases
in which preexisting knowledge is made use of.” (Schumpeter [1939, III.A]).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the abstract theory and
illustrate its operation by means of the vintage/AK model. Section 3 decentralizes the optimal
allocation, proves the two welfare theorems and show, by means of examples, how entrepreneurs
compete and receive their reward. In so doing we also show how new goods, ideas in particular, are
priced and how this may affect the distribution of income. Section 4 concentrates on growth
anomalies and show that joint production can play the same role that fixed costs and externalities
play in other models. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Households
We consider an infinite horizon economy, t = 0,1,2,u with a continuum of homogeneous
consumers. Consumers value characteristics ct 5 +
J where J is the number of characteristics. The
period utility provided by the consumption of characteristics during an interval of time, is denoted
uÂctÃ.
Assumption 1 The period utility uÂ6Ã is strictly increasing, concave, smooth, and bounded below.
Total lifetime utility is given by UÂcÃ = >t=1
K Nt?1uÂctÃ, where 0  N < 1 is the common
subjective discount factor.
The assumptions that the utility function is strictly increasing and concave are standard. The
smoothness of the period utility function is convenient and, for a concave function, not terribly
restrictive. The assumption that the period utility function is bounded below is technically useful. It
insures that UÂcÃ is well defined (although possibly infinite). As we are concerned with the theory of
growth, not the theory of subsistence, we are primarily interested in the behavior of uÂ6Ã for large
and possibly growing quantities of consumption, so the behavior of the utility function near c = 0i s
rather secondary to our ends. Moreover, from an intellectual perspective, if uÂ0Ã = ?K this has the
counterfactual implication that no amount of consumption, however large, will compensate for anyprobability of c = 0, no matter how small this probability might be. footnote 
Characteristics ct are acquired through the consumption of commodities. The potential number
of commodities is countably infinite although, at each point in time, only a finite number of them
will be produced or consumed. The period commodity space consists of the set X ¹ +
K composed of
sequences Âx1,x2,u,xn,uÃ  0 for which xn = 0 for all but finitely many n. The overall commodity
space is then
X * =¼ t=0
K X
The vector of characteristics acquired by the consumption of a single unit of commodity n is
denoted by Cn 5 +
J. These induce a linear map C : X  +
J.S o ,i fxt denotes the vector of
commodities consumed at time t the characteristics enjoyed by the agent are ct = Cxt.W ea l s o
denote by Cj the map Cj : X  + from commodity vectors to the amount of characteristic
j = 1,u,J acquired. footnote 
Production
Production takes place through linear activities. An activity a is a pair of vectors ÂkÂaÃ;yÂaÃÃ
where kÂaÃ 5 X denotes the input of commodities entering the activity at the end of period t,a n d
yÂaÃ 5 X the output of commodities made available by the activity at the beginning of the following
period. During period t + 1 the outputs can either be consumed or used as inputs for further
production.
The set of potential activities is countable and denoted by D.
Assumption 2 D2.
Any collection of activities A ¹ D can be simultaneously operated at every non negative level
VÂaÃ as long as inputs >a5A VÂaÃkÂaÃ are available. We assume also that D satisfies no-free-lunch
and it allows for free disposal. footnote 
Assumption 3 For all a 5 D if kÂaÃ = 0, then yÂaÃ = 0; if ÂkÂaÃ,yÂaÃÃ is an activity in D with
yÂaÃ  0, then the activity ÂkÂaÃ;0Ã is also in D.
Denote the vector of activity levels at time t as Vt 5 +
D and define the aggregate stock of capital
at time t as kt = >a5D Vt?1ÂaÃyÂaÃ ? xt, where xt is aggregate consumption at time t.
Definition A pair V 5 Â¼t=0
K +
DÃ,k 5 X * is called a production plan and x 5 X * is called a
consumption plan. Together they determine an allocation.
Definition The allocation V 5 Â¼t=0
K +
DÃ,k 5 X *,x 5 X * is a feasible allocation for the initial
condition k0 if
>
a5D
VtÂaÃyÂaÃ  kt+1 + xt+1
kt  >
a5D
VtÂaÃkÂaÃ,
for all t = 0,1,u
We call an activity a 5 D viable at t for initial condition k0, if there exists a socially feasible
allocation starting from k0 and such that VtÂaÃ > 0. We denote the set of viable activities at time t
from k0 by AtÂk0Ã. Note that AtÂk0Ã will, in general, be a proper subset of D. This occurs whenever,
for some a 5 D and some index n denoting a commodity, we have knÂaÃ > 0 and there is no feasible
allocation from k0 such that the vector of outputs yt?1 has yn,t?1 > 0. Similarly, we call a commodity
n viable at time t for the initial condition k0 if there exists a socially feasible allocation starting fromk0 and such that yn,t > 0. Our analysis is greatly simplified by assuming that, for any initial vector of
capital stocks k0, the set of viable activities is finite.
Assumption 4 For all k0 5 X , AtÂk0Ã is finite.
Finally, we assume that it is possible to produce all characteristics in every period.
Assumption 5 For all k0 there exists a feasible allocation with Cjxt > 0f o ra l l1 j  J and
t > 0.
Example – Vintage Capital and AK Models
We illustrate the model with a simple class of economies. There is a single Characteristic, so that
J = 1. The period utility function has the CES form uÂcÃ = ?Â1/SÃÄcÅ
?S, S > 0. There are two types
of commodities, a single consumption good and an infinite sequence of different vintages of capital,
indexed by i = 0,1,u . The consumption good may be converted into the desired characteristic on
a1 –1 basis. We write a commodity vector x = Âz,UÃ where z is a scalar denoting the consumption
good and U is an infinite vector of capital stocks of different vintages, and we let the symbol ei
denote the vector consisting of one unit of vintage i capital and zero units of all other vintages. So,
for example, Â0,e2Ã is a commodity vector with 0 units of consumption, 1 unit of vintage 2 capital
and zero units of everything else.
There are 2 sequences of activities. One sequence of activities, Ä0,ei;Li,0Å with L > 1, produces
consumption from vintage i capital. Notice that different vintages of capital differ in how effective
they are at producing consumption. The second sequence of activities,Ä0,ei;0,_ei+1Å with _ > 0,
produces _ units of vintage i + 1 capital from 1 unit of vintage i capital.
The endowment k0 is a single unit of vintage 0 capital. Notice that in this setup, at time t there
can only be capital of vintage t, so that this is a vintage capital model, as in Solow [1960], Benhabib
and Rustichini [1991] or Chari and Hopenhayn [1991].
We look for a social optimum where capital grows exponentially from one vintage to the next,
and a constant fraction d of the stock of current vintage capital is used in the production of the
consumption good. Let Utt denote the amount of vintage t capital at time t. One unit of this capital
can be used to produce Lt units of consumption good, yielding a marginal present value utility of
NtLtÂdLtUttÃ
?S?1. Alternatively it can be used to produce _ units of vintage t + 1 capital for time t + 1,
leading to a present value marginal utility of _Nt+1Lt+1ÂdLt+1Ut+1,t+1Ã?S?1, where Ut+1,t+1 = _Â1 ? dÃUtt.
Equating payoffs from the two alternative uses of capital we get
_Â1 ? dÃ = ÂN_L?SÃ
1/￿1+Sˆ
Notice that _Â1 ? dÃ is the growth rate of the capital stock. The corresponding growth rate of
consumption is
gc=L_Â1 ? dÃ = ÂN_LÃ
1/￿1+Sˆ
If NÂN_LÃ
?S/￿1+Sˆ  1 this yields an infinite present value of utility; otherwise total lifetime utility is
finite, which is the interesting case.
Notice that while this example is based upon the most primitive form of technological
innovation, in which technology improves in each period and at a rate that is exogenously fixed, the
growth rate of the economy is endogenous, since it depends on the rate of capital accumulation. In
particular, if the economy becomes more productive (as measured by _ or L), or more patient (as
measured by N or S?1), it grows faster.
It is easy to modify this example to endogenize the technology choice. If we introduce the
activity Ä0,ei;0,KeiÅ , then it becomes possible to reproduce the current vintage of capital. Now
there is a choice: reproduce the existing vintage of capital and remain technologically stagnant, ormove on to the next vintage of capital?
If K > 1 growth, in the sense of an unbounded accumulation of physical capital and ever
growing flows of output, is feasible even in the absence of technological innovation. Assume,
moreover, that K > _ so that a unit of current capital is more productive at reproducing itself than at
producing the next quality. In other words, technological innovations are costly. Nevertheless, it is
easily seen that when L_ > K the new technology is sufficiently productive that the only vintage of
capital produced is the latest possible one.
This example shows how to distinguish between the two main sources of economic growth
(Schumpeter [1911, 1934]): (i) unbounded accumulation of reproducible inputs, due to constant
returns to scale; (ii) adoption of more efficient methods of production, as embodied in new activities
or goods. In this case, when L_ > K the choice between unbounded accumulation and introduction
of a new, superior machine is solved once and for all in favor of the second option.
Decentralization
The model presented so far, is one of optimal growth. Much of our interest, though, is in the role
played by individual entrepreneurs in inducing technological change. As usual, these two are tied
together by the welfare theorems describing how optimal allocations may be decentralized by
competitive pricing schemes. After proving the relevant welfare theorems for this model, we
examine the role of profits, competition and entrepreneurship in the introduction of new
technologies and commodities.
Optimality and Supporting Prices
Definition The allocation aD = VD 5 Â¼t=1
K +
DÃ, kD 5 X *, xD 5 X * solves the social planner
problem for initial condition k0 if it solves
max
V,k,x UÂcÃ
subject to: ct = Cxt, and feasibility of the production plan.
Let pt 5 +
K be the price of commodities at time t and p 5 S = Â¼t=0
K +
KÃ a whole sequence of
prices from time zero to infinity. In a competitive equilibrium these prices must satisfy two
conditions: they should yield zero profits and support the preferences.
Definition Given k 5 X * and V 5 Â¼t=0
K +
DÃ the prices p 5 S satisfy the zero profit condition if,
pt+1yÂaÃ ? ptkÂaÃ  0,-a 5 AtÂk0Ã, t = 0,1,u
with equality if VtÂaÃ > 0. That is profits
^t+1ÂaÃ = VtÂaÃÄpt+1yÂaÃ ? ptkÂaÃÅ = 0
Definition Given prices p 5 S, the sequence xD 5 X * solves the consumer’s maximization
problem if xD is the argmax of
max UÂcÃ
subject to : ct = Cxt, >
t=1
K
ptxt  >
t=1
K
ptxt
D
Definition The pair p 5 S and xD 5 X * satisfy the first order conditions for consumer’s
maximization if
pnt
D  Nt?1DuÂCxt
DÃCnwith equality unless xnt
D = 0.
Definition The pair p 5 S and kD 5 X satisfy the transversality condition if
lim
T￿KpTkT
D = 0
Definition The feasible allocation V 5 Â¼t=0
K +
DÃ,k 5 X *,x 5 X * and the price sequence p 5 S are
a competitive equilibrium if they satisfy the zero profits condition and solve the consumer’s
maximization problem.
Decentralization Theorem
We give a statement of the first and second welfare theorems that fit our purpose. A proof can be
found in the Appendix.
Theorem Suppose assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. Suppose that VD, kD, xD is a feasible
allocation given k0 and that >t=1
K Nt?1uÂCxt
DÃ < K. Then the following three conditions are
equivalent:
(1) VD, kD, xD solve the planner’s problem for initial condition k0.
(2) There exist prices pD satisfying the zero profit condition and such that xD solves the
consumer maximization problem given pD with >t=1
K pt
Dxt
D < K.
(3) There exist prices pD satisfying the zero profit condition such that the pair pD and xD
satisfies the first order conditions and the pair pD and kD satisfies the transversality condition.
Entrepreneurship, Profits and Competition
Almost always, general equilibrium discussions of product innovation begins with some type of
market imperfection, such as monopolistic competition, increasing returns or externalities. Our
theory of innovation abstracts from these imperfections: entrepreneurs have well defined property
rights to the full proceeds from their innovations; individual production processes display constant
returns; there are no fixed costs and no unpriced spillover effects from innovation. Does this lead to
an interesting theory of innovation? We believe it leads to a theory that, while more parsimonious
than established ones, is more versatile and has at least the same amount of explanatory power.
Although the basic ingredients of fixed factors, rents and sunk costs are familiar from the standard
theory of competitive equilibrium, the way in which they fit together in an environment of growth
and innovation is apparently not well understood. A review will serve to explain our claim that
traditional theory can go a long way toward explaining endogenous technological innovation and
entrepreneurial activity.
Consider a single entrepreneur who is contemplating introducing a new activity, either to
produce an existing good more efficiently or to produce a brand new good. He anticipates the prices
at which he will be able to buy inputs and sell his output, and introduces the innovation if, at those
prices, he can command a premium over alternative uses of his endowment. He owns the rights to
his innovation, meaning that he expects to be able to collect the present discounted value of
downstream benefits.
To see specifically how this works, consider the vintage capital model from the previous section
with L_ > K. Recall, that the growth of consumption was given by gc = ÂN_LÃ1/￿1+Sˆ. The first order
condition is that the consumer must be indifferent between consuming in period t and t + 1.
Consequently, the relative price of the consumption commodity between two periods must be L_,and the equilibrium present value price pzt
D of the consumption commodity is
pzt
D J ÂL_Ã?t.
A unit of vintage t capital can produce Lt units of the consumption commodity at time t + 1. The
entrepreneur who introduces this new kind of capital has a claim to its entire output. Competition
between different entrepreneurs forces profit to zero, so the price of vintage t capital at time t, pUtt
D ,i s
pUtt
D = _?t?1
L .
An entrepreneur who attempted to reproduce his existing vintage of capital, would make a negative
profit at these equilibrium prices. In this sense, the competitive pressure from other entrepreneurs
forces each one to innovate in order to avoid a loss.
As in theories of monopolistic competition and other theories of innovation, new technologies
are introduced because of the role of individual entrepreneurs in seeking out profitable opportunities.
Unlike those theories, the entrepreneur does not actually end up with a profit. Because of
competition, only the owners of factors that are in fixed supply can earn a rent in equilibrium. When
a valuable innovation is introduced, it will use some factors that are in fixed supply in that period.
Those factors are likely to earn rents. If you are good at writing operating systems code when the PC
technology is introduced, you may earn some huge rents, indeed. In principle, this model allows a
separation between the entrepreneurs who drive technological change by introducing new activities,
and the owners of fixed factors who profit from their introduction. However, it is likely in practice
that they are the same people.
Pricing of New Commodities
Recursive Arbitrage Pricing
We turn now to a broader examination of pricing. Recall our definition of supporting prices for
consumption goods. We used their characteristics’ content and the marginal utilities of those
characteristics at an allocation xD 5 X *. The price pnt of good n at time t, when xnt
D > 0i s
pnt
D  Nt?1DuÂCxt
DÃCn.
These supporting prices can be used to derive “no arbitrage prices” for new goods that are
exclusively consumed: these goods are priced according to the characteristics they contain.
Similarly, goods which produce characteristics and can also be used as inputs, can be priced
according to the characteristics they contain, provided that it is optimal to consume these goods in
equilibrium. Such pricing by arbitrage puts a natural bound on the equilibrium prices of new goods
and, through it, on the size of the rents accruing to their owners. To summarize:
Theorem Let VD,kD,xD be a competitive equilibrium supported by the price sequence pD.
Consider a period t 5 Æ1,2,uÇ and a good n which is viable at t. Let Cn be its characteristic
vector and denote with pnt
D the price of this good at time t. Assume there exists a collection of goods
Æn1,u,nnvÇ, which are consumed in positive quantity at time t and have characteristic vectors Cnj
such that
Cn = >
j=1
nv
Jj 6 Cnj, Jj 5 , -j.
Thenpn,t
D  >
j=1
nv
Jj 6 pnj,t
D
with equality if good n is consumed in positive quantity at time t.
Proof: Follows directly from the supporting prices condition. QED
We are left with pure intermediate or capital goods. In the simple case in which the intermediate
good is the sole input of an activity with an output that can be priced by arbitrage, the zero profit
condition provides a straightforward pricing equation. In general, though, by means of the zero profit
condition one, can only price bundle of inputs in terms of bundles of outputs, as more than one input
is used in any given activity and we are also allowing for joint production. Then a set of
simultaneous equations, one for each activity, must be solved to yield the prices of the intermediate
goods. This is the general case, which needs to be considered in some detail.
Let us assume that in equilibrium all characteristics are consumed. In period t, consider the
vector of Mt inputs Ut 5 +
Mt which are pure intermediate goods: that is they can be used as inputs,
but do not directly produce characteristics. Let rt 5 +
Mt be their price vector, to be determined.
Denote with zt 5 t
L the vector of inputs which are also consumption goods. Let their prices be
qt 5 +
Lt, which we take as given in the light of the previous discussion. Assume At linearly
independent activities are operated. Partition the input vector of activitya as kÂaÃ = ÂUÂaÃ,zÂaÃÃ.The
zero profit condition requires that
rt 6 UÂaÃ = Ârt+1,qt+1Ã6yÂaÃ ? qt 6 zÂaÃ
for a = 1,u,At.C l e a r l y ,w h e nAt  Mt, the solution is a straightforward matrix inversion. In this
case
rt = Bt
1rt+1 + Bt
2qt+1 ? Bt
3qt, qt = Nt?1DuÂCxt
DÃC.
where Bt
1,Bt
2,Bt
3 can be calculated by matrix inversion. The former equation can be iterated forward.
By making appropriate use of the transversality condition, we recover the traditional “net present
value of future utilities flow” formula for pricing capital goods
rt = >
b=0
K
Ej=0
b?1Bt+j?1
1 ÂBt?1
2 ? Bt+b?1
1 Bt
3Ã qt+b
where Bt?1
1 is understood to be the identity matrix and Bt?1
2 is zero.
When At < Mt only At bundles of pure intermediate goods can be uniquely priced by the same
method. This implies a certain “indeterminacy” of individual prices. Such indeterminacy concerns
only prices of pure intermediate goods during the initial period. It is the outcome of the interaction
between the input-output nature of linear activities and the completely inelastic supply of the pure
intermediate goods in any given period.
Example: Arbitrage Pricing
Consider an economy in which there are two characteristics, so J = 2, three consumption
commodities and one type of labor. The utility function over the two characteristics is a symmetric
Cobb Douglas, i.e. uÂc1,c2Ã = Âc1Ã1/2Âc2Ã1/2. The three consumption goods, z1,z2 and z3,h a v et h e
following vectors of characteristics:
C1 = Ä1,0Å C2 = Ä0,1Å C3 = ÄO,1Å; O > 0
The commodity vector is therefore x = Äz1,z2,z3,Å. To economize on notation let ei
z denote thethree-dimensional vector with one in the position of consumption good i and zero elsewhere. There
are three potential activities, one for each consumption good. They are
azi = Ä0,1;ei
z,1Å i = 1,2,3.
In words: labor can produce any of the three consumption goods, on a 1-1 basis while also
reproducing itself.
Let this economy begin with an endowment of 2 units of labor. The set of initially available
activities is A0 = Æaz1,az2Ç. So, at the beginning, the third consumption good is not viable.
As long as At = A0 the optimal production plan is
VÂaz1Ã = VÂaz2Ã = 1.
The supporting prices for the two consumption goods are
pz1,t+1 = pz2,t+1 = Nt
2 , t = 0,1,u.
The zero profit condition can be applied to derive the equilibrium prices of labor
wt+1 = wt ? pzi,t+1, i = 1,2; t = 0,1,u.
The transversality condition or, which is the same, the intertemporal budget constraint, yields
w0 = N
2Â1 ? NÃ
, from which wt = Nt+1
2Â1 ? NÃ
Now consider what happens when the set of available activities is enlarged. Our interest here is not
in the transition path and the oscillations in the value of aggregate output innovations may bring
about (which, we note, is also interesting and left to the reader). We will look directly at the new
steady state. Let AT = Æaz1,az2,az3Ç. There are still only two units of labor available, which implies
that, in total, at most two units of the three consumption goods can be produced. In equilibrium, we
will have z2 = 0 as the third consumption good costs as much labor as the second but provides a
strictly greater vector of characteristics. Hence, after the transition period, VÂaz2Ã = 0a n dt h et w o
units of labor are allocated to the production of z1 and z3.
Maximization of steady state utility gives the optimal production plan. Along this, an amount
equal to 1 of the first characteristic and an amount equal to 1/Â1 ? OÃ of the second are produced and
consumed in each period t = T + 1,T + 2,u
VÂaz1Ã = 1 ? 2O
1 ? O ,
VÂaz2Ã = 0,
VÂaz3Ã = 1
1 ? O .
The supporting prices for the three consumption goods, and the labor input can be computed once
again by straightforward application of our decentralization theorem. Write R = Â1 ? OÃ1/2 < 1.
Then, for t = T,T + 1,u:
pz1,t+1 = pz3,t+1 = Nt
2R ,wt+1 = wt ? pzi,t+1, i = 1,2,3.
The price of the second consumption good is a little tricker, because it is not actually produced or
consumed. From the first order condition for consumers, a lower bound on the price is
pz2,t+1  NtR
2 ,
otherwise consumers would demand to consume good 2. However, the price could be higher than
this, and the activity producing the second good we still earn a negative profit, so we would still
have an equilibrium. If we adopt the standard convention that for pure consumption goods, price is
equal to the lowest equilibrium price, then the inequality becomes and equality, and in addition, the
arbitrage pricing theorem holds. We will adopt this convention for the remainder of the paper.
From the latter and the intertemporal budget constraint, an explicit wage rate is obtained in each
period
wt = Nt+1
2RÂ1 ? NÃ
.
At the new equilibrium prices the activity az2 makes negative profits
^t
z2 = NtR
2 ? Nt
2R < 0, as R < 1;
which justifies the choice of VÂaz2Ã = 0.
Notice also that
pz3,t+1 = O 6 Âpz1,t+1Ã + 1 6 Âpz2,t+1Ã
The price of the third consumption good is a linear combination of the supporting prices of the other
two goods, with weights equal to the coordinates of its characteristics vector.
Profits Versus Rents
The previous example is a good starting point for discussing the way in which entrepreneurial
innovations generate changes in the relative prices that may appear as rents to certain factors, how
this affects income distribution across factors and in what sense these changes in relative prices
should be considered as the “appropriate” competitive equilibrium rewards to entrepreneurial
activity.
The assumption that there is only one type of labor, which is equally effective in producing any
of the three kinds of consumption, implies that the social surplus generated by the introduction of the
third consumption good is immediately appropriated by every member of society. The channel
through which this productive surplus flows to the households, is the equilibrium price of labor
which increases from Nt+1/2Â1 ? NÃ to Nt+1/2RÂ1 ? NÃ. The labor input employed in az3 is perfectly
substitutable with the labor input employed in az1, hence they must earn the same wage rate and the
two capital goods must also be equally priced.
Nevertheless, the innovation is readily implemented as everyone has a private incentive to do so
and constant returns to scale allow everyone to do so, arbitraging away profit opportunities.
Example: Profits, Rents and Income Inequality
We now examine what happens when we have differentiated labor. One type of labor may
benefit from the introduction of a new technology, while the other does not.
Specifically, assume that there are two types of labor, h = 1,2, in equal amounts, 1 = 1a n d2 = 1. The difference between 1 and 2 is that only the latter is able to produce z3 Hence 2 can be
used in any of the three activities az1,az2,az3 with unchanged productivity, while usage of 1 is
limited to the first two.
The competitive equilibrium when At = Æaz1,az2Ç is the same as before: the two inputs are
perfect substitutes, given the viable technology set, and earn the same income. When the set of
viable activities expands to AT = Æaz1,az2,az3Ç, the equilibrium allocation now becomes
V *Âaz1Ã = 1 ? O
2 ,
V *Âaz2Ã = O
2 ,
V *Âaz3Ã = 1.
This is substantially different from the one we obtained before when the innovation was
implemented. This is because the limited supply of 2 constrains the level at which the third activity
can be operated. This implies it is now efficient to operate also the second activity. The different
production plan is reflected in the equilibrium consumption of the two characteristics, which is now
c *i = 1 + O
2 for i = 1,2. Equilibrium prices now yield strictly zero profits for all three activities:
p * z1,t+1 = p * z2,t+1 = Nt
2 ,
p * z3,t+1 = NtÂ1 +O Ã
2
for all t = T,T + 1,u. Our theorem on the pricing of new goods by arbitrage holds, and
p * z3,t+1 = O 6 Âp * z1,t+1Ã + 1 6 p * z2,t+1.
The combination of innovation and lack of substitutability between 1 and 2 drastically alters the
distribution of income among factors of production. The wage of the first type of labor, 1 remains at
its pre-innovation level
w * t
1 = Nt+1
2Â1 ? NÃ
while that of 2 increases to
w * t
2 = Nt+1Â1 +O Ã
2Â1 ? NÃ
.
With heterogeneous labor, technological progress alters income distribution and, in this example,
increases income inequality. Contrary to the previous case in which all inputs were perfect
substitutes, the introduction of the new good generates a rent going to the only input which can
produce the new commodity. The effect of this change in relative prices is large, as it transfers to 2
the total increase in aggregate output O/2Â1 ? NÃ. But, this additional income accruing to 2 is not too
large, at least if we look at it from the point of view of the incentives to innovate. Once the new
activities are discovered the difference between total output with 2 and without 2 is exactly equal to
the incrrease in 2’s income. This corresponds to full private appropriation of 2 social contribution
and generates the correct incentives for implementing the innovation. Innovating is therefore fully
consistent with perfect competition and entrepreneurial rents are explained by changes in the relativeprices of scarce resources.
A few extra remarks on the implications of this example may be in order. It should be obvious
how to generalize it to the case in which there are many heterogeneous agents, each one endowed
with a vector of different skills. Index these skills with s = 1,u,S, and assume technological
progress generates a sequence of consumption goods zi, with i = 1,2,u, such that technology
requires skills of indices s  i to operate the activity azi. Then one has a model of increasing
specialization and division of labor in which the distribution of income changes over time because of
the endogenous flow of economic innovations.
This type of framework is useful to formalize the idea that trade is more beneficial, and its
volume increases, as individuals are made more heterogenous by technological progress. Assume
there are heterogeneous individuals endowed with the different factors. Due to the assumption of
constant returns to scale, agents are equally well off either altogether or in complete isolation when
only the most primitive technology is available, as anybody can operate all activities and produce all
viable goods. This is not possible at a more advanced stage when certain goods become available
only by trading with other agents that either have the unique skill required to operate the new
machine or can operate the same machines we can operate but at a lower unit cost. In this sense, the
example shows that, in the absence of fixed costs, the division of labor and the size of the market are
both limited by the degree of technological progress.
Pricing of Ideas
It is ordinarily thought that ideas or creative works are produced with a fixed cost, and that
consequently, are inconsistent with perfect competition. There is a large literature on the appropriate
type of monopoly (copyright or patent) governments should provide to permit the production of
ideas and creations. It might seem then, that the competitive framework has little to contribute to the
understanding of the production of ideas and creative works. Surprisingly, this is not the case: once
we carefully model the element of time in production, we see that the issue is not one of fixed cost,
but rather a sunk cost, and there is little reason to believe that competition is unable to deal with
sunk costs. The issue, if there is one, revolves not around fixed cost, but rather around an
indivisibility. As we shall see, even this indivisibility need not pose a problem for our competitive
framework.
Our basic example is motivated by the production of music. The central idea is that the initial
production of a song requires an investment of time over several periods. Following the initial
production, that is, the composition of the song, the song may be inexpensively reproduced.
Example – Competition in Ideas
In this example there is a single characteristic so that J = 1. The period utility function is
uÂcÃ = ?Â1/SÃÄcÅ
?S with S > 0. There are four commodities: raw labor, a single consumption good
(music), and two different kinds of capital: intermediate capital (a half finished song) and final
capital (a finished song). The consumption good may be converted into the desired characteristic on
a1 –1 basis. We write a commodity vector x = Â,z,T,UÃ where the first entry is labor, the second
consumption, the third intermediate and the fourth final capital. Prices are labelled by the respective
commodity superscript. In the initial period the economy is endowed with one unit of labor and
nothing else.
There are two ways of obtaining consumption, together they comprise a grand total of 6
activities. The first way is from labor directly: one unit of labor today generates one unit of
consumption tomorrow. This may be thought of as performing an existing not terribly good song.
The corresponding activity, activity 1, has the form Ä1,0,0,0;0,1,0,0Å.
The second way of obtaining consumption is more roundabout: it uses labor to obtain a halffinished song (the intermediate capital) from which a finished song (final capital) is derived. The
latter is an input both in reproducing itself and in producing the consumption good. We model the
former by specifying activity 2 as Ä1,0,0,0;0,0,1,0Å. Activity 3 uses intermediate capital to produce
final capital, Ä0,0,1,0;0,0,0,1Å. Activity 4 uses final capital to produce K  1 units of final capital
Ä0,0,0,1;0,0,0,KÅ. Activity 5 uses final capital to produce consumption Ä0,0,0,1;0,_,0,0Å, where
_ > 1. Finally, activity 6 allows for storage of raw labor from one period to the next
Ä1,0,0,0;1,0,0,0Å.
The interpretation is that _ represents the quality of the song, and K the (inverse of the)
reproduction cost. The latter especially can be a large number: once the song is written production of
additional copies may be relatively cheap.
For _ and/or K large enough, the roundabout process dominates the direct one as a way of
obtaining consumption from labor. Moreover, if there is any final capital in the economy the
technology of producing final capital directly from itself dominates the roundabout method of
production. In other words, a song will be written only once, using labor first and then its first draft
(intermediate capital) to obtain a final version in period two. After that, additional copies of the
half-written song (intermediate capital) are not useful: final capital reproduces itself at a rate K  1,
while consumption is obtained, at a rate _ > 1, from that portion of final capital that is not
reproducing itself.
By the same token, activities 1 and 6 are used in parallel only during the first two periods: to
produce consumption for periods 1 and 2and to carry over labor from period zero to period one.
From period three onward, consumption produced from final capital, via activity 5, becomes
available. This implies that there are only two important types of production decision. First, which
fraction i 5 Ä0,1Å of initial labor to divert in the first period to the roundabout production of capital;
and, second, what fraction d of final capital to devote to the production of consumption once final
capital becomes available. Naturally, we solve the second problem first.
Equilibrium quantities and prices
Because utility is CES the fraction d 5 Ä0,1Å of final capital used to produce consumption does
not depend on the current stock of final capital. As usual, we may solve
KÂ1 ? dÃ = ÂNKÃ
1/￿1+Sˆ.
where KÂ1 ? dÃ is the long run growth rate of both consumption and final capital. The later is larger
than one whenever K > N?1, which we assume. For later use we compute
d = 1 ? ÂNK?SÃ
1/￿1+Sˆˆ = 1 ? N *K * ?S.
The restriction KS > N, suffices to guarantee that d 5 Â0,1Ã. Altogether, we need KS > N > K?1,
which rules out the case S = ?1.
We now consider the tradeoff between labor used to produce consumption directly and
indirectly. Notice that 1 ? i is the fraction of labor used to produce consumption directly in the first
two periods. Equalizing the marginal utility of consumption in the first two periods requires
c2 = N *c1. Consequently, i = 1 ? Â1 + N *Ãc1 = 1 ? N !c1. Note that c1 units of labor invested in activity
1 in period zero, yield, next period, an equal amount of consumption, with marginal utility equal to
NÂc1Ã
?S?1.
The fraction i = Â1 ? N !c1Ã yields, in period 3 consumption with marginal utility equal to
N3_ _d 1 ? N !c1
?S?1
.Write _ * = _
1
1+S .W eh a v e
i
1 ? i
= N * 2_ * ?S
dN ! .
After substitution we get
i = N * 2_ * ?S
N !Â1 ? N *K * ?SÃ + N * 2_ * ?S .
Again, the restriction KS > N suffices to guarantee that the fraction i is in Â0,1Ã.
Next, we compute the supporting prices. In every period, the price of consumption is
proportional to marginal utility. In the first two periods
p1
z = p2
z J N N !Â1 ? N *K * ?SÃ + N * 2_ * ?S
1 ? N *K * ?S
1+S
.
For the early periods, the zero profit conditions imply
p0
￿ = p1
z = p1
￿ = p2
z; p2
U = p1
T = p0
￿; p3
z = p2
U
_ = p2
z
_ .
For the other periods t  2, zero profits imply
pt
U = Kpt+1
U ; pt
U = _pt+1
z
and, therefore,
pt+1
z
pt+1
U = K
_ .
Both the present value price of capital and consumption decreases at a rate 1/K per period, with the
relative price determined by the ratio K/_. Further, pt
￿ = 0 for all t  2, as it is not needed anymore.
The usual condition KS > N is enough to guarantee that both the transversality condition
lim
t–K pt
UUt = 0,
and boundedness of total utility along the optimal path
>
t=1
K
Nt?1uÂctÃ < K
obtain.
Let us now discuss the, implications of the model. To do this, it is useful to distinguish the case
S 5 Â?1,0Å from the case S > 0.
Elastic demand
This ocurs when S 5 Â?1,0Å. Notice first that the condition KS > N is more restrictive the closer
S is to ?1. This makes sense: a high growth rate of consumption and capital together with high
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption lead to unbounded utility.
We now study the impact of an increase in the value of either _ or K on the competitive
equilibrium. We are especially interested in the impact of increasing K. This corresponds to lowering
the reproduction cost, as would be the case, for example with modern digital technology fordistributing music over the internet.
Consider first the case K  N1/S. The share of labor going into the production of intermediate
capital is
i = N * 2_ * ?S
N !Â1 ? N *K * ?SÃ + N * 2_ * ?S
which converges to one, while the price of that labor (and the corresponding consumption) in period
one (and two) converges to infinity. This case is especially significant, because it defies conventional
wisdom: as the cost of reproduction declines, the competitive rents increase, despite the fact that
many more copies are distributed. Yet the basic assumption is simply that it take some (small)
amount of time to redistribute copies, and that demand is elastic. Notice that music producers and
others have argued that with the advent of a technology for cheap reproduction their profits are
threatened and increased legal monopoly powers are required. Yet this model shows that quite the
opposite is possible: decreasing the reproduction cost makes it easier, not harder, for a competitive
industry to recover production costs. Notice also that competition (unlike monopoly) does not
require downstream licensing provisions: if each purchaser of music is permitted to freely reproduce
and sell it makes no difference to the competitive equilibrium. The only “copyright” protection
needed in this competitive industry is the right of first sale. The value of all subsequent sales is
simply capitalized into the price of the first sale.
Similar comparative statics hold in the case where _  K, in which case, again i goes to one and
the initial price of labor goes to infinity
Inelastic demand
This case ocurrs when S 5 Â0,KÃ. We will examine it briefly, because it is of less practical
relevance and because, in light of the previous discussion, most results should be obvious.
We now find that as _  K, i  0. However, as K  K we have i approaching a finite limit
lim
K￿Ki = N * 2_ *
N * 2_ * + N ! .
Even with inelastic demand, as the cost of reproduction falls, rent remains bounded away from zero.
Indivisibility
Our basic observation is that the fact that production is roundabout does not imply that there is a
fixed cost. The initial capital must be produced; once it has been produced, production of the
consumption good is relatively inexpensive. This means a sunk cost, as the cost of producing the
initial capital is sunk at the time the consumption good is produced. But it is not a fixed cost, in the
sense that we can maintain the assumption of constant returns to scale. Moreover, the fact that a
good is an input into its own production, as is the case with the reproduction of music (or other
creations or ideas) has no particular implication for competition.
Our constant returns to scale assumption does, however, have one implication, which may be
thought of as less than realistic. We assume that if half as much labor is initially invested in the
production of the initial song, it is the same as having half as many songs throughout the lifetime of
the song. It may reasonably be argued that a song produced at half the effort is much less than half as
many songs. This however, and despite appearances, is not an example of increasing returns to scale,
but simply an indivisibility. That is, if less than a minimum initial amount of labor T is invested, then
no song is produced at all. (If desired, an upper bound on the amount of labor can be added as well,
but this does not imply an indivisibility, and can easily be modelled by adding a fixed factor.) Does
this not invalidate our analysis, perhaps necesitating government grants of monopoly to operate this
market?A moment of reflection will show that our model is still quite relevant. The mere fact that we
introduce an integer constraint into the model does not imply that it binds. Provided that
i = N * 2_ * ?S
N !Â1 ? N *K * ?SÃ + N * 2_ * ?S  T
our analysis remains unchanged. Moreover, in the case of most relevance to modern policy
discussions – elastic demand and large K – we observed that i is likely to be quite large. This means
that the advent of cheap modern digital copying makes integer constraints on production of ideas and
creations less likely to bind, and so weakens the case for government enforced monopoly.
Patterns of Innovation
The simple vintage capital model exhibits two basic sources of growth: capital accumulation and
the introduction of new technologies. A basic feature of this model and our framework more broadly
is efficiency: the competitive equilibrium maximizes the welfare of the representative individual.
Can such a class of models capture growth anomalies: an initially poorer country in the long-run
using a superior technology, or a modest increase in savings leading to a dramatic increase in
growth? Certainly, models with fixed costs or other increasing returns can. A country that is far
along the learning curve for an inferior technology may not wish to pay the fixed cost of introducing
a completely different technology. A modest increase in savings can lower the marginal cost of
investment leading to even greater investment. However, it is by no means the case that increasing
returns are necessary for such conclusions, and insofar as there is empirical support for conclusions
of this type, it cannot be taken as evidence of increasing returns to scale.
Our basic observation is that joint production can link the level of current consumption to the
kind as well as level of future capital stock. As a result, joint production can play much the same role
in our theory that fixed costs do under monopolistic competition: the need to produce a second
commodity in order to use a particular technology acts as a kind of fixed cost, although it is
consistent with constant returns, competitive decentralization and efficiency.
Savings and Innovation
We begin by examining the theoretical relationship between savings and growth. The basic result
is that pattern of technological adoption in competitive equilibrium maximizes the long-term growth
rate for each savings rate. An important corollary is that in the absence of joint production the
technologies that lead to the most rapid rate of growth must be adopted. This is a kind of generalized
convergence result: even in the presence of endogenous technological innovation all countries with
the same technological possibilities wind up using the same technologies in the same sequence.
After establishing these basic theoretical results, we illustrate through example how joint production
can lead to growth anomalies through their counterintuitive consequences for savings rates.
Theorem If a solution to the social planner problem VD,kD,xD is decentralized by prices pD and a
socially feasible plan V,k,x satisfies
pt
Dkt
pt
DÂkt + xtÃ
 pt
Dkt
D
pt
DÂkt
D + xt
DÃ
then
>
a5At
pt+1
D VtÂaÃyÂaÃ  >
a5At
pt+1
D Vt
DÂaÃyÂaÃ
Proof: From the initial condition p0
Dk0 = p0
Dk0
D. From the hypothesis on savings and the zero
profit condition pt+1
D yÂaÃ ? pt
DkÂaÃ, it follows recursively that pt
Dkt = pt
Dkt
D, that is, a plan that devotesno greater fraction of the value of output to savings never has a more valuable capital stock. From
the zero profit condition we also have >a5A VtÂaÃÄpt+1
D yÂaÃ ? pt
DkÂaÃÅ  0a n d
>a5A Vt
DÂaÃÄpt+1
D yÂaÃ ? pt
DkÂaÃÅ = 0, from which the conclusion now follows directly.
QED
This theorem shows that higher total output than that from the socially optimum plan is possible
only by a higher savings and investment rate. However, the measure of output is GNP plus the
market value of the stock of capital after depreciation. Since the measurement of GNP requires some
arbitrary conventions about what constitutes “new” capital, we cannot state an equivalent result for
GNP. Moroever, an equivalent theorem cannot hold for consumption, it would always be possible to
consume a great deal in a single period by diverting production out of the capital sectors. The next
theorem shows, however, that the only way to increase consumption over the social optimum is to
overinvest, or periodically divert production into consumption. In particular, if the investment rate is
fixed, then no plan can have a higher long-run rate of consumption growth than the competitive
equilibrium plan.
Theorem If a solution to the social planner problem VD,kD,xD is decentralized by prices pD and a
socially feasible plan V,k,x satisfies
pt
Dkt
pt
DÂkt + xtÃ
 pt
Dkt
D
pt
DÂkt
D + xt
DÃ
then, for all b:
>
b=T
K
pb
Dxb  >
b=T
K
pb
Dxb
D
Proof: As in the previous theorem, pt
Dkt  pt
Dkt
D at all t. For any feasible plan, the zero profit
condition implies pt+1
D xt+1 + pt+1
D kt+1  pt
Dkt, with equality for an optimal plan. Together with the
tranversality condition, this implies that >b=T
K pb
Dxb  pT
DkT, with equality for the optimal plan. This
now yields the desired conclusion. QED
The previous two theorems show that the competitive equilibrium maximizes the growth rate for
a given savings rate. What consequences does competitive equilibrium have for the rate at which
new goods and technologies are introduced? To see how quickly new technologies are introduced,
we consider using the same technologies as used in the competitive equilibrium, but diverting all
output into investment. If this is possible, then our next theorem shows that this yields the highest
possible level of output at each moment of time. It follows that no alternative method of introducing
new technologies can yield a higher growth rate, and consequently that the competitive equilibrium
introduces new technologies as quickly as is “desirable.”
Theorem If a solution to the social planner problem VD,kD,xD is decentralized by prices pD and if
there exists a socially feasible plan V ! such that Vt
DÂaÃ = 0 implies V ! tÂaÃ = 0 and satisfies
pt
D>
a5D V ! tÂaÃkÂaÃ = pt
D>
a5D V ! t?1ÂaÃyÂaÃ
then for any socially feasible plan V,k,x
>
a5D pt+1
D VtÂaÃyÂaÃ>
a5D pt+1
D V ! tÂaÃyÂaÃ
Proof: Consider any feasible plan V,k,x and a solution to the social planner problem VD,kD,xD.
Then >a5D VtÂaÃÄpt+1
D yÂaÃ ? pt
DkÂaÃÅ  0a n d
>a5D V ! tÂaÃÄpt+1
D yÂaÃ ? pt
DkÂaÃÅ = 0 follows from the assumption that V ! diverts all output to
investment. The desired inequality>a5D pt+1
D VtÂaÃyÂaÃ  >a5D pt+1
D V ! tÂaÃyÂaÃ follows.QED
Like the previous two theorems, this theorem seems to point in the direction of convergence.
However, it is as significant for what it does not say as for what it does say. It requires that it be
possible to divert all output to investment using only the activities that are actually used in the
competitive equilibrium. A moment’s reflection will show that with joint production this may not be
possible. To switch output into investment, it is necessary to replace activities that produce both
capital and consumption goods with activities that produce only capital. If the activities that produce
only capital were not used in the original equilibrium, the conclusion of the theorem can fail. We
now explore by example the way in which this type of joint production can play a role in competitive
theory very like the role that fixed costs do under monopolistic competition.
Joint Production and Innovation
Example–Comparative Advantage of Backwardness
We first construct an example in which we compare two countries facing the same technological
possibilities, but with different starting conditions. Our goal is to give conditions under which the
more advanced country, by being locked into an existing technology, actually grows more slowly in
the long-run than the less advanced country. Notice that if the technology allows the diversion of all
output into investment using the competitive activities, such an example is impossible.
There is one characteristic, preferences are CES, and, as in the simple vintage capital model,
there are no fixed factors. There are three kinds of commodities: the consumption good, which
provides the characteristic on a one-to-one basis, and two kinds of capital goods, each of which
comes in many different qualities. Denote the infinite vectors containing the quality ladders for these
two kinds of capital goods as U1 and U2 and write a commodity vector as x = Äz,U1,U2Å. We still use
the indicator function ei to represent a unit of quality i capital stock; the position of ei in the
commodity vector will tell if it is of type one or type two. So for, example, Ä0,0,e3Å is a vector with
zero consumption, zero amount of U1 and one unit of U2 of the 3rd quality.
The set of activities is composed by the following triplets, for i = 0,1,u
ai1 = Ä0,ei,0;Li,ei+1,0Å, L > 1;
ai2 = Ä0,0,ei;Wi,0,ei+1Å W > 1;
ai12 = Ä0,ei,0;0,0,Ke1Å K > 0.
The first two activities represent the production possibilities of the first and second quality ladders;
here each kind of capital reproduces itself and produces either Li or Wi units of the consumption
commodity at the same time. We assume that W > L so that U2 is a better kind of capital stock than
U1: as it moves from one quality to the next the rate at which its ability to produce consumption
increases is higher than that of U1. Hence, in the long run, the growth rate of consumption generated
by the second quality of capital will always dominate the one generated by the first quality. There is
also a technology that allows the conversion of the poor capital U1 into the better capital U2.
Regardless of what quality of type 1 capital is available, a unit of U1 always converts into K units of
U2, of quality i = 1.
We assume that the endowment at time t = 0 is initially 1 unit of quality i capital of the first
type. The only decision is what fraction d 5 Ä0,1Å of this capital to convert to U2 by means of ai12.
Total utility, for given d,i sg i v e nb y? Â1/SÃ>
t=1
K
Nt?1ÄÂ1 ? dÃLt+i + dKWtÅ?S.
The derivative of this expression with respect to d is
>
t=1
K
Nt?1ÄÂ1 ? dÃLt+i + dKWtÅ?S?1ÄKWt ? Lt+iÅ,
and if any capital is to be converted, it must be that for d = 0 this expression is positive, or
equivalently
>
t=1
K
Nt?1ÄLtÅ?S?1ÄKWt ? Lt+iÅ > 0.
Letting i  K this expression approaches ?K so if the existing quality of capital of type 1 is
sufficiently advanced, the superior kind of capital, type 2, will never be introduced. On the other
hand, for K sufficiently large, this expression will be positive for i = 0, so that a less advanced
starting point will result in a long run more advanced kind of capital stock and higher growth rate of
consumption forever. An implication of this simple observation is that both catch-up and jumping
ahead phenomena are easily modelled with constant returns and perfect competition.
This example also answers the question of whether initial conditions may matter for long-term
growth when there is perfect competition. In this model, despite assuming that exactly the same
technologies are feasible and that preferences are identical, the different initial conditions lead to
diverging long-term growth rates. It is easy to tilt the example around showing that, under
appropriate circumstances, poorer countries may be the loser and grow at a lower growth rate for
extended periods of time or even forever. For the sake of brevity we will only sketch the intuition
here. Assume that the switch-over activity satisfies
ai12 = 0, ei
K￿i?Mˆ ,0;0,0,ei?L .
with K > 1 M,L  0. That is to say: more advanced countries have lower transition costs and/or can
switch to a more advanced quality of the new technology. Given a value for the quality index i in the
initial period, one can select triples K,M,L to obtain any pattern of behavior: from immediate
adoption, to fast adoption, slow adoption or no adoption for a number of periods. The latter
technology can be modified further by introducing a labor saving mechanism and an activity that
allows for endogenous growth of the labor force. Then a less advanced country, with a high enough
growth rate of the labor force, will postpone forever the adoption of the more advanced type of
capital. footnote 
Finally, we should also point out that this example can be generalized to explain phenomena
which, in the literature, are often attributed to the existence of externalities and market
inefficiencies. What we have in mind is the so-called “path dependence” literature, (see Arthur
[1989], David [1985] or Krugman [1991]). The latter posits that a number of historical
episodes footnote  can only be explained by appealing to external effects, increasing returns and, as a
consequence, allocational inefficiencies. In Boldrin and Levine [1997] we study various versions of
our abstract model to argue that, as a matter of theory, those episodes are consistent with constant
returns, no externalities and allocational efficiency.
Example: Role of Investment in Technological ProgressA phenomenon related to the issue of whether it is “too expensive” to introduce a new
technology, is the question of the impact of a small change in preferences on growth. For example,
with increasing returns to scale, a small increase in patience can lead to a large increase in long-run
consumption, as the small initial increase in savings lowers the marginal cost of further investment
through economies of scale. However, the previous example shows that in the competitive
environment, similar “ratcheting up” effects are possible when a small increase in the savings rate
allows a jump to an entirely different technology. Once again, increasing returns to scale are seen to
play no essential role in explaining “growth anomalies” such as the dependence of growth rates (and
growth rates of productivity and TFP as well) on saving/investment rates.
Recall from the previous example, the condition
>
t=1
K
Nt?1ÄLtÅ?S?1ÄKWt ? Lt+iÅ > 0.
determining whether the new higher growth technology will be introduced. Notice that for low
values of t KWt < Lt+i holds, while the opposite is true for large t, because W > L. Suppose that the
parameters ND,LD,KD,WD are such that the overall expression is equal to zero. Notice that the long
run growth rate of the “old technology” economy is L since capital simply produces its next
generation plus an ever increasing amount of consumption Li. Similarly, the growth rate of the “new
technology” economy is W. Consequently, a small increase in the subjective discount factor N from a
number slightly smaller than ND to a number slightly larger than ND causes the long-run growth rate
to discontinuously change from L to W.
Conclusion
This paper studies a model of perfect competition in which endogenous technological
innovations and entrepreneurial activity make sense. It is based on the idea that innovative activity
takes places because, under competitive pricing, entrepreneurs appropriate the social value of their
innovations. Changes in the relative prices of inputs and outputs are the channels through which the
increase in social welfare is funnelled into private benefits. Technological change is neither
exogenous to individual choices, nor constant, nor dependent upon the existence of external effects,
increasing returns or monopoly power. It is the product of tireless search for profitable opportunities
on the part of a large number of agents. It depends upon initial conditions and relative prices. Its
adoption changes relative prices, income distribution, relative factor productivities and growth rates.
In this sense, we provide here a theory of Total Factor Productivity, as advocated in Prescott [1998].
In this paper our focus has been on the theoretical determinants of the introduction of new
technologies. Key to our finding is the role of joint production, which plays a role in competitive
theory similar to that of a fixed cost in the theories of monopolistic competition. When capital and
consumption are jointly produced, as for example when the production of consumption goods leads
to new human capital, then initial conditions matter in the long run. As a consequence of the
importance of initial conditions, we can have poverty traps, catch-up and falling-behind types of
phenomena.
An important extension of this work is to adapt our examples to show how growth can be
cyclical and that a balanced growth rate arises only as a statistical average among different,
oscillatory, growth rates. To us this suggests, among other things, that a theory of long-run and
short-run oscillations in aggregate and individual factors productivity may be built within the general
framework we have proposed here.
We also show how competitive equilibrium prices ideas and inventions, and more generally,
goods for which prototypes are produced only once followed by reproduction at low and constant
marginal costs. It does not appear that fixed costs do or should play any role in this analysis. If thereis an issue, it is with the indivisibility of ideas, and we point out that despite this indivisibility,
perfect competition may well be able to deliver the goods, that is, a steady supply of new inventions,
creations and ideas.
Appendix
We provide here the proof of the decentralization theorem
Theorem Suppose assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. Suppose that VD, kD, xD is a feasible
allocation given k0 and that >t=1
K Nt?1uÂCxt
DÃ < K. Then the following three conditions are
equivalent:
(1) VD, kD, xD solve the planner’s problem for initial condition k0.
(2) There exist prices pD satisfying the zero profit condition and such that xD solves the
consumer maximization problem given pD with >t=1
K pt
Dxt
D < K.
(3) There exist prices pD satisfying the zero profit condition such that the pair pD and xD
satisfies the first order conditions and the pair pD and kD satisfies the transversality condition.
Proof: First we observe that if the zero profit condition holds then the transversality condition is
true if and only if >t=1
K pt
Dxt
D < K. Indeed from the zero profit condition
p0
Dk0
D ? pT+1
D kT+1
D = >
t=0
T
Âpt
Dkt
D ? pt+1
D kt+1
D Ã = >
t=0
T
pt+1
D xt+1
D
Â3ÃimpliesÂ2Ã Suppose that these first order conditions and the tranversality condition are
satsified. Under Assumption 4 there is an NtÂk0Ã such that if n > NtÂk0Ã the commodity n is not
viable. Let Nt  NtÂk0Ã.D e f i n et h eT truncated utility function by UTÂcÃ = >t=1
T Nt?1uÂctÃ. Consider
the problem of maximizing of UTÂcÃ + pT+1
D kT+1
D subject to
ct = Cxt, >
t=1
T
pt
Dxt + pT+1
D kT+1  >
t=1
T
pt
Dxt
D + pT+1
D kT+1
D .
and xn = 0f o rn > Nt. The truncated first order conditions
pnt
D  Nt?1DuÂCxt
DÃCn with equality unless xnt
D = 0
are sufficient for a solution to this problem. Since this is true for arbitrarily large Nt, xD is also a
solution to the truncated problem where xn 5 X. Suppose that xD does not solve the infinite problem.
Then there is a budget feasible x ! that yields more utility. The budget feasibility of x ! implies that the
pair Æx !0,x !1,u,x !TÇ, kT+1 = 0 is budget feasible in the truncated consumer problem. Since xD is the
optimum in the truncated problem, this in turn means that
UTÂCxDÃ + pT+1
D kT+1
D  UTÂCx !Ã
However, UTÂCxDÃ  UÂCxDÃ and from the transversality condition pT
DkT
D  0. It follows that
UÂCxDÃ  lim
T–KUTÂCx !Ã,
which is the desired contradiction.
(2) implies (1) This is a standard first welfare theorem proof.
(1) implies (3) Suppose that VD, kD, xD is a solution to the planner problem for the initialcondition k0.F o rpT 5 Â¼t=0
T +
KÃ,l e tpTÂk0Ã denote the vector of prices of viable commodities only.
Observe that VD, kD, xD solves the problems of maximizing UTÂCxÃ subject to social feasibility and
kT+1  kT+1
D . Since by Assumption 4 AtÂk0Ã is finite this is a finite dimensional problem over the
viable commodity space. By standard finite dimensional arguments, we can find a price vector
pTÂk0Ã over the viable commodities so that the first order conditions are satisfied for those
commodities and the zero profit conditions are satisfied. Note that the zero profit conditions need
only hold for viable activities, and such activities can only use and produce viable commodities in
positive amounts, so the prices of non-viable commodities are irrelevant to the zero profit condition.
For non-viable commodities, we simply define
pnt
T = Nt?1DuÂCxt
DÃCn.
Our proof will be complete if we can show that as T  K, pT has a limit point (in the product
topology), and that this limit point satisfies the tranversality condition. Since the prices of non-viable
commodities do not depend on T they obviously converge. The components of p0
T corresponding to
non-zero elements of k0 are bounded above by some B0 and below by zero. From the zero profit
condition, it follows that for each t there is a number Bt such that the largest component of pt
T
corresponding to a commodity viable at time t is less than or equal to <i=0
t Bi. This shows the
existence of a limit point pD in the product topology; by construction, this limit point satisfies the
first order conditions; it remains to show it satisfies the tranversality condition. Recall that it is
enough to check that >t=1
K pt
Dxt
D < K . From the first-order condition, this will be true if
>
t=1
K
Nt?1DuÂCxt
DÃCxt
D < K.
Since u is concave and bounded below by uÂ0Ã we have that uÂCxt
DÃ  uÂ0Ã + DuÂCxt
DÃCxt
D,a n ds o
>
t=1
K
Nt?1DuÂCxt
DÃCxt
D  >
t=1
K
Nt?1ÄuÂCxt
DÃ ? uÂ0ÃÅ < K
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